The Crime against Humanity of Apartheid in a Post-Apartheid World by Lingaas, Carola
 Oslo Law Review, 2015, Issue 2, 86-115 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5617/oslaw2566 
 
 
 
The Crime against Humanity of Apartheid in a 
Post-Apartheid World 
Carola Lingaas* 
Abstract 
The crime against humanity of apartheid has been widely neglected: jurisprudence is non-existent 
and the academic discourse modest. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the first international 
criminal tribunal to include the crime against humanity of apartheid in its statute, notwithstanding 
the controversy of this crime. According to critics the crime is a South African phenomenon that has 
not reached the status of customary law. The provision on apartheid in the Rome Statute of the ICC 
builds on the Apartheid Convention, which is highly contentious and not signed by any Western State. 
All the more, it is surprising that apartheid was included in the Statute. 
Despite the fact that the crime of apartheid has never been prosecuted, this article argues that its 
inclusion into the Rome Statute raises some unique and interesting questions. It shows the 
international community’s belief in the deterrent effect of this crime, as well as its continued 
importance. This article will scrutinise the elements of the crime and reveal definitional challenges. It 
will, in particular, discuss potential contemporary situations of apartheid. The ICC Prosecutor will 
have to release apartheid from its historical connection in order to bring to justice perpetrators of 
systematic racial oppression. 
Keywords: apartheid, crime against humanity, Rome Statute, Apartheid Convention, North Korea, 
Palestine.  
  
1. Introduction 
More than twenty years ago, the South African apartheid regime ended with the first 
fully democratic elections. From its inception until the fall of the regime in 1994, the 
United Nations (UN) stood unified in its effort to bring down this institutionalised 
system of racial discrimination. Apartheid was criminalised as a crime against humanity 
in 1973 with the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid (Apartheid Convention).1 However, the Convention was highly 
contentious and has, until today, not been ratified by any State of the industrialised West. 
No trial or conviction for the crime of apartheid has ever occurred — and the Apartheid 
Convention is widely believed to be a dead letter.2 Perhaps the crime of apartheid ended 
                                                        
*PhD candidate, Faculty of Law, Department of Public and International Law, University of Oslo, email: 
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1 General Assembly Resolution 3068 (XXVIII) (30 November 1973). 
2 An assessment which is very critical of the crime of apartheid as found in the Apartheid Convention is 
given by the South African professor of law Hercules Booysen, Convention on the Crime of Apartheid, 2 
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with the abolishment of the South African apartheid regime? It is all the more surprising 
that the crime against humanity of apartheid was included in a last minute compromise 
into the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)3 in 1998, four years after 
the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa. Despite its reoccurrence in international 
law, legal scholarship has largely turned a blind eye onto this crime. This paper will 
attempt to fill this gap by (re)awakening the interest in this crime. Not only will it reveal 
the potential and the pitfalls of the crime of apartheid, this article also argues for the 
recognition of the crime of apartheid to contemporary regimes. 
This article will perform a legal analysis of the crime of apartheid as found in Article 
7(1)(j) Rome Statute. Most importantly, it will answer the question whether the crime 
against humanity of apartheid is a relict of a bygone era or could potentially be used for 
prosecutions before the ICC. This article will demonstrate that the crime of apartheid 
can be applied to cases other than South Africa, provided it can be disconnected from its 
historical link to the South African apartheid regime. Similar to the crime of genocide, 
which had — historically and analytically — to be released from the Holocaust, the 
crime of apartheid has to cut the ties to Southern Africa in order to gain independent 
significance. 
Due to the contentiousness of the Apartheid Convention, some authors claim that the 
crime of apartheid should not be considered an international crime, and that it has not 
reached customary law status either.4 This article will attempt to prove them wrong. 
Instead of treating the crime of apartheid as a relict, we should focus on the current 
importance of the crime and identify potential cases for prosecution before the ICC. As 
an international crime, apartheid has no geographic or historical limitations, rather, it is 
a crime against humanity, as are murder and torture. 
The primary legal sources applied in this article are the relevant international treaty and 
customary law norms, foremost the Rome Statute and the Apartheid Convention. 
Domestic law will be considered in as much as it is found to be of importance to the 
discussion. As secondary sources, scholarly writing and reports, notably by the 
International Law Commission and the UN Commissions of Inquiry, will be used. Due to 
the complete absence of criminal proceedings for the crime of apartheid, case law plays 
a subordinate role. 
This article first examines the history of the crime of apartheid, before reviewing the 
crime’s inclusion into the Rome Statute as well as its status in customary law. The main 
body of this article is concerned with a legal analysis of the elements of crime and 
related definitional challenges. The article ends with looking into two apartheid-like 
                                                                                                                                                                             
South African Yearbook of International Law (1976), who calls the convention, amongst other things, ‘a 
masterpiece of hypocrisy’ (60). 
3 A/CONF.183/9 (17 July 1998) entered into force on 1 July 2002. 
4 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 13; 
Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law (OUP, Oxford 2001) 3. 
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situations, North Korea and Palestine, and draws the conclusion that the application of 
the crime of apartheid in the near future should not be ruled out. 
 
2. A Brief History of the Crime of Apartheid 
Apartheid literally signifies ‘apartness’ in Afrikaans and is not easily applied to cases 
other than that of South Africa: any similar situation seemingly demands a comparison 
with South Africa during the apartheid regime. This chapter will, in order to create an 
understanding for the crime of apartheid, briefly look into the origins of apartheid in 
Southern Africa and the criminalisation of apartheid by the Apartheid Convention, 
before turning into the colloquial use of the term. 
2.1. Origins of Apartheid 
The system of apartheid dates back to the 1930s when the South African Bureau of Race 
Relations (SABRA) created a plan on the separate development of races, building on the 
conceived historical legitimacy of apartheid as a logical outcome of the European 
settlement at the Cape in 1652.5 Opposed to assimilation or integration, apartheid was a 
political and a legal system that maintained the differences of the various racial6 groups 
by aiming at their separate development. The term apartheid has subsequently been 
associated with the racial segregation policy implemented by the South African National 
party’s government during the years 1948—1994.7 Ultimately, the apartheid policy 
resulted in over 14,500 civilians being killed and many more affected, by restrictions of 
virtually every single aspect of life, ranging from free movement and public services, to 
choice of domicile or spouse.8 
The term ‘apartheid’ was coined by the South African Prime Minister, Daniel Malan, in 
1944, to denote the country’s official policy of racial segregation between whites and 
various non-white groups; while Hendrik Verwoerd is seen as the architect of apartheid, 
who claimed it to be a policy of good neighbourliness.9 With the appointment of 
Verwoerd as Minister of Native Affairs in 1950, the use of apartheid as a slogan and as a 
                                                        
5 Paul Rich, ‘South Africa’, in Jay Sigler (ed), International Handbook on Race and Race Relations 
(Greenwood Press, Westport 1987) 252. 
6 A more detailed analysis of the terms ‘race’ and ‘racial’ in the context of apartheid will be performed 
subsequently. At this point, the term is used uncritically and as such undefined. 
7 Alette Smeulers and Fred Grünfeld, International Crimes and other Gross Human Rights Violations: A 
Multi- and Interdisciplinary Textbook (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2011) 109; Johan Van der Vyer, 
‘Apartheid’, in Dinah Shelton (ed), Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity (Thomson Gale, 
Farmington Hills 2005) 47. 
8 Jennifer Balint, Genocide, State Crime and the Law: In the Name of the State (Routledge, Abingdon 2012) 
17. 
9 Natan Lerner, The UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff International Publishers, Alphen aan den Rijn 1980) 42; Christine Byron, War Crimes and 
Crimes against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Manchester University 
Press, Manchester 2009) 239; Smeulers, Grünfeld (n 7,)109-110; Rich (n 5) 250. 
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State program drastically increased.10 The segregation of Africans from the white society 
was presented as being beneficial, both in order to protect the whites from an ever-
present and increasing black menace (called the swaart gevaar), and also seemingly in 
the interests of the African societies themselves.11 The South African system was unique 
in regards to the extent to which racial segregation and discrimination were formalised 
in the law.12 
2.2. The Criminalisation of Apartheid 
Apartheid was outlawed as an international crime against humanity with the adoption of 
the 1973 Apartheid Convention. Although, the 1968 Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity was 
the first to list apartheid as a crime against humanity, without prescribing individual 
criminal liability, however. The choice of the term ‘apartheid’ by the Apartheid 
Convention was by no means coincidental: it was a direct referral to apartheid South 
Africa.13 The applicability of the Convention is, however, contested: some scholars claim 
that the Convention was meant to apply exclusively to the South African context, while 
others emphasise that the wording of the Convention opens for application to other 
racialised regimes.14 The Convention, created in the Cold War era, was highly criticised 
and politicised.15 To date, it has still not been ratified by any States of the industrialised 
West. Not only was the treaty said to be the product of a Russian conspiracy against the 
West, several states also feared indictment for aiding and abetting the South African 
regime. Its application to any situation unrelated to that regime was therefore 
considered highly unlikely.16 
2.3. The Use of the Apartheid Terminology 
Miscellaneous situations have been described as ‘apartheid’, though often not in the 
legal sense of the word, but usually as a moral description or by analogy to the South 
African case. Among the countless examples is the Indian caste system or sexual 
                                                        
10 Rich (n 5) 250. 
11 ibid 239. 
12 Smeulers, Grünfeld (n 7) 109. 
13 At the time of the creation of the Apartheid Convention, the term was also used with regard to other 
territories in Southern Africa, such as South West Africa (Namibia), Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), the Portuguese 
Territories (Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe) and Basutoland 
(Lesotho), Swaziland and Bechuanaland (Botswana). See Lerner (n 9) 41-42, 125-127; M Cherif Bassiouni, 
Introduction to International Criminal Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2nd edn 2013) 201; Max 
Du Plessis, ‘International Criminal Law: The Crime of Apartheid Revisited’ (2011) 24 South African Journal 
of Criminal Justice 423; Luc Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives 
(OUP, Oxford 2005) 59. 
14 Bassiouni (n 13) 153; Du Plessis (n 13) 423; Ilias Bantekas, International Criminal Law (4th edn Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2010) 236. 
15 Alexander Zahar, ‘Apartheid as an International Crime’ in Antonio Cassese (ed), The Oxford Companion 
to International Criminal Justice (OUP, Oxford 2009) 245. 
16 Ariel Bultz, ‘Redefining Apartheid in International Criminal Law’, (2013) Criminal Law Forum 216-217; 
Roger Clark, ‘Apartheid’ in M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed), International Criminal Law (3rd edn. Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden 2008) 599—600. 
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apartheid.17 The Norwegian press seems to be particularly sympathetic to the use of the 
apartheid terminology. Recent examples include a headline in a newspaper on 
‘Introduction of an apartheid system’ regarding the alleged unequal treatment of clinical 
nutrition students and their fellow students in medicine at the University of Oslo;18 
gender apartheid in Saudi-Arabia;19 apartheid in Norwegian schools with all-white 
classes,20 the degrading treatment of Roma and beggars in public spaces21 and academic 
apartheid against Iranian students at Norwegian universities.22 
Although these examples are not necessarily legally relevant, they demonstrate how the 
apartheid discourse extends beyond both its historical and territorial aspects, and its 
contemporary legal definition. While we have seen that apartheid is recognised as a 
concept not limited to South Africa in its common use, can we say the same of the legal 
concept of the international crime of apartheid? The next chapter will analyse the crime 
against humanity of apartheid, as found in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). 
 
3. The Crime of Apartheid in the Rome Statute 
3.1. The Inclusion of Apartheid into the Rome Statute 
Prior to its inclusion in the Rome Statute, apartheid had been defined as a crime against 
humanity by Article 1(b) Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to 
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity and by Article I Apartheid Convention. 
However, none of the major precedents to the ICC, contained the crime against humanity 
                                                        
17 Some examples from contemporary sources: ‘India: “Hidden Apartheid” of Discrimination against Dalits’ 
Human Rights Watch (13 February 2007) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/02/13/india-hidden-
apartheid-discrimination-against-dalits>; Balakrishnan Rajagopal, ‘The Caste System — India’s Apartheid?’ 
The Hindi Newspaper (18 August 2007) <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/the-caste-
system-indias-apartheid/article1894191.ece>; similarly, from a Norwegian source: ‘Det Skjulte 
Apartheid?’ [‘The Hidden Apartheid?’] Morgenbladet Newspaper (Norway 11 February 2005) 
<http://morgenbladet.no/debatt/2005/det_skjulte_apartheid>; Peter Tatchell, ‘Direct Action is Necessary 
because Homophobia is Sexual Apartheid’ The Pink Paper (7 October 1994) 
<http://www.petertatchell.net/direct_action/sexual_apartheid.htm> all accessed 9 October 2015. 
18 Original title: ‘Medisinprofessor varsler: Har innført apartheidssystem’ [Introduction of an apartheid 
system] Universitas Newspaper (Oslo 30 September 2015) (paper copy on file with the author); 
http://universitas.no/nyheter/60874/medisinstudenter-utdannes-til-arroganse> accessed 9 October 
2015.  
19<http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/03/07/kultur/meninger/kronikk/saudi-
arabia/kvinnedagen/32192939/> accessed 9 October 2015.  
20 Mona Claussen, ‘Norsk Apartheid Vekker Internasjonal Oppsikt’ [Norwegian Apartheid Attracts 
International Attention] Aftenposten Newspaper (Norway 28 November 2011) 
<http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/Norsk-apartheid-vekker-internasjonal-oppsikt-
6708574.html> accessed 9 October 2015. 
21 Magnus Nygren Syversen, ‘Sammenligner Norge med Sør-Afrika under Apartheid’ [Comparing Norway 
with South Africa under Apartheid] Fredrikstad Blad (Fredrikstad, Norway 3 December 2013) 
<http://www.f-b.no/nyheter/nyheter/sammenligner-norge-med-sor-afrika-under-apartheid/s/2-2.952-
1.8194189> accessed 9 October 2015. 
22 <http://www.nettavisen.no/nyheter/--norge-driver-med-akademisk-apartheid/6644916.html> 
accessed 9 October 2015. 
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of apartheid in their statutes.23 Indeed, apartheid was not included in the draft statute 
for the ICC either. Interestingly, one of the first drafts of the Rome Statute was based 
upon the 1981 Study on Ways and Means of Insuring the Implementation of International 
Instruments such as the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of 
the Crime of Apartheid, Including the Establishment of the International Jurisdiction 
Envisaged by the Convention, thus at a very early stage linking the crime of apartheid 
with a prospective ICC.24 The 1981 study was drafted as a result of the Apartheid 
Convention explicitly demanding the creation of an international penal tribunal with 
jurisdiction over the crimes listed in the Convention (Article V). 
In 1992, the International Law Commission (ILC) presented a Draft Code of Crimes 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, into which apartheid was incorporated.25 In 
this version of the Draft Code of Crimes and on the establishment of an international 
criminal court, the ILC suggested that the prospective court should have exclusive and 
compulsory jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, systematic or mass violations of 
human rights, apartheid, illicit international trafficking in drugs as well as seizure of 
aircraft and kidnapping of diplomats or internationally protected persons.26 In other 
words: the crime of apartheid was considered to be on par with the crime of genocide, 
thus one of very few crimes of such seriousness that the international criminal court 
should assume exclusive jurisdiction. Indeed, the ILC even explains the court’s exclusive 
jurisdiction was justified in that ‘[c]ertain crimes because of their particular gravity, 
heinous nature, and the considerable detriment they cause to mankind, must come 
within the purview of an international criminal court’.27 Furthermore, the gravity of the 
crime of apartheid is emphasised by the Commission’s statement: 
[I]t is possible to make a distinction between the most serious crimes, such 
as genocide and apartheid, which involve mass and systematic violations 
of universal values, and other crimes, and to limit the exclusive jurisdiction 
rule to crimes in the first category.28 
Although this ILC Draft coincides with the final years of the South African apartheid 
regime and as such certainly was influenced by the events of the time, it nevertheless 
demonstrates the uncontested seriousness of the crime of apartheid. Apartheid is 
                                                        
23 Precedents include the Nuremberg Tribunal, Tokyo Tribunal, Control Council Law No 10, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR). 
24 UN Doc E/CN.4/1426. Bassiouni (n 13) 584—585; M Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the 
International Criminal Court (Transnational Publishers, Ardsley 2005) 33, 61—62. 
25 ‘Report by Mr Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur. Tenth report on the draft Code of Crimes against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind’ (20 March 1992) UN Doc A/CN.4/442. 
26 <http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_442.pdf&lang=EFS> 55, para 36, 
accessed 30 October 2015.  
27 <http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_442.pdf&lang=EFS> 55, para 38, 
accessed 30 October 2015. 
28 <http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_442.pdf&lang=EFS,> 55, para 40, 
accessed 30 October 2015. 
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repeatedly compared to genocide, which is nowadays considered ‘the crime of crimes’.29 
However, this legal classification of the crime of apartheid has fallen into oblivion with 
the end of the South African regime. The inclusion of apartheid into the 1992 Draft has 
furthermore been criticised for overlooking the prevalent doubts about the crime’s 
customary nature.30 The Status of apartheid in customary international law will 
subsequently be examined in Chapter 4. 
The ILC’s Draft Code of Crimes of 1996 contained a generic version of apartheid, 
prohibiting ‘institutionalised discrimination on racial, ethnic or religious grounds 
involving the violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms’, hence without 
reference to the South African situation. 31  The ILC stated that institutionalised 
discrimination was ‘in fact the crime of apartheid under a more general denomination’,32 
thereby implying that not only racial, but also ethnic and religious groups were 
protected.33 Neither of the Draft Codes were acted upon. 
It was only at the Rome Diplomatic Conference34 that the inclusion of the crime of 
apartheid into the list of crimes against humanity was suggested by the countries of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC).35 There was some initial reluctance 
from other state delegations towards this proposition. Nonetheless, a majority of states 
urged for the recognition of this inhumane act, arguing that if apartheid would not be 
explicitly listed as a crime against humanity, it would implicitly be subsumed under 
‘other inhumane acts’ of Article 7(1)(k) Rome Statute. Put differently, since the crime 
was already implicitly contained in the Rome Statute, it might as well be singled out and 
given its own provision. An argument against its inclusion was that any widespread or 
systematic policy of apartheid would fall under the provision on persecution on racial 
grounds (Article 7(1)(h) Rome Statute), a separate provision on apartheid was therefore 
superfluous.36 At the end, however, the delegations agreed that apartheid was of a 
                                                        
29 See for example the title of a seminal work on the crime of genocide: William Schabas, Genocide in 
International Law – The Crime of Crimes (2nd edn Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009). 
30 Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes – Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005) 259. 
31 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/7_4_1996.pdf> accessed 30 October 
2015. See also Byron (n 9) 241. 
32 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/7_4_1996.pdf> accessed 30 October 
2015. 
33 Christopher Hall, ‘The Crime of Apartheid’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (2nd edn Verlag CH Beck, Munich 2008) 228. 
34 Full title: The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June—17 July 1998. See for more information: 
<http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/contents.htm> accessed 30 October 2015. 
35 UN Doc A/CONF.183/C.1/L.12 (22 June 1998); see also: Roger S Clark, ‘Historical Efforts to Codify 
Crimes against Humanity’, in Leila Nadya Sadat (ed), Forging a Convention on Crimes against Humanity 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011), 25. 
36 Timothy McCormack, ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ in Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donnelly 
(eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues (Hart Publishing, Portland 2004) 
198; Herman Von Hebel, Darryl Robinson, ‘Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court’ in Roy S. Lee (ed), 
The International Criminal Court – The Making of the Rome Statute; Issues, Negotiations, Results (Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague 1999) 102. 
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character and gravity similar to other inhumane acts and merited its own criminal 
provision.37 In retrospect, it has been argued that the inclusion of the crime of apartheid 
into the Rome Statute has led to an increased harmonisation of international criminal 
law. In prior instruments, the crime had already been afforded the status as a crime 
against humanity, this was confirmed by the Rome Statute, thereby leading to an 
expansion of the commonly accepted list of crimes against humanity.38 The fact that the 
crime of apartheid was singled out as a crime against humanity and did not end up in the 
residual provision of ‘other inhumane acts’ is indeed a strong reaffirmation of the 
universal condemnation of this inhumane practice.39 Critical voices, however, assert that 
Article 7(2)(h) Rome Statute is incoherent, ambiguous and inoperable.40 One scholar, 
Roger Clark, even claims that the crime of apartheid was an example ‘of the use of the 
law as affirmation, exclamation or denunciation rather than a string in the prosecutorial 
bow’.41 Although Clark also rightfully points out that the ‘practice [of apartheid] is now 
so deeply condemned by the world’s conscience that it is inconceivable that a modern 
code of crimes ( ...) would omit a specific reference to apartheid’.42 Nevertheless, he 
considers the addition of the crime into the list of crimes against humanity ‘more 
symbolic than anything else and that the proscribed actions are already caught 
elsewhere’.43 In this context, historic parallels to the crime of genocide should be drawn. 
As late as 1982, legal scholars claimed that the Genocide Convention was ‘more symbolic 
than a legislative contract’44 and that ‘[g]enocide has been charged with controversy 
from its very inception and it has never enforced specific punishment for cases of 
genocide’.45 Indeed, wording that resembles the academic discourse on the crime of 
apartheid. Nowadays, nobody would even dare to discuss the continued importance of 
the crime of genocide or the Genocide Convention, particularly after the occurrences in 
Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia. Similarly, the crime of apartheid can gain 
independent significance if applied to contemporary situations, as will be discussed later 
for the case of North Korea and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
3.2. The Actus Reus of the Crime against Humanity of Apartheid 
Article 7(1)(j) in conjunction with Article 7(2)(h) Rome Statute defines the crime against 
humanity of apartheid as follows: 
                                                        
37 Von Hebel, Robinson (n 36) 102. 
38 Caroline Fournet, International Crimes : Theories, Practice and Evolution (Cameron May, London 2006) 
36. 
39 Ilias Bantekas, Susan Nash, International Criminal Law (3rd edn Routledge-Cavendish, London 2007) 136.  
40 Bultz (n 16) 205. 
41 Roger Clark, ‘Crimes against Humanity and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, in 
Mauro Politi and Giuseppe Nesi (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – A Challenge to 
Impunity (Ashgate, Aldershot 2001) 88. 
42 ibid 87. 
43 ibid 88. 
44 Jack Nusan Porter, ‘What is Genocide? Notes Towards a Definition’, in Jack Nusan Porter (ed), Genocide 
and Human Rights: A Global Anthology (University Press of America, Lanham 1982) 7. 
45 ibid 8. 
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1. For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means any 
of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge 
of the attack:  
(j) The crime of apartheid; 
 ( …) 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1:  
(h) ‘The crime of apartheid’ means inhumane acts of a character similar 
to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an 
institutionalised regime of systematic oppression and domination by one 
racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the 
intention of maintaining that regime.46 
Article 21 Rome Statute contains a detailed provision on the applicable law for the ICC. It 
places in consecutive order, first, the Rome Statute, the Elements of Crimes and the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Article 21(1)(a)). Secondly, where appropriate, 
applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law (Article 21(1)(b)). 
Thirdly, it lists the general principles of law, should both the first and second order fail. 
The general principles have to be consistent with the Rome Statute and international 
law as well as internationally recognised norms and standards (Article 21(1)(c)). The 
ICC may — but does not have to — apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its 
previous decisions (Article 21(2)). For this analysis, the interpretation of the provisions 
contained in the Rome Statute are of primary importance. Although the Elements of 
Crimes are not strictly binding, they help clarify the different elements of each crime and 
as such are a tool to assist the Court in their interpretation.47 
The following analysis of the elements of the actus reus of the crime against humanity of 
apartheid builds on a legal interpretation of Article 7(1)(j) and Article 7(2)(h) Rome 
Statute. The general, overarching requirements of crimes against humanity in the 
chapeau of Article 7 Rome Statute will hereafter not be analysed; instead, the focus will 
be on the specific requirements of the crime of apartheid.48 Since the Rome Statute is a 
treaty by nature, the interpretative criteria in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
                                                        
46 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, circulated as document A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 
1998 and corrected by procès-verbaux of 10 November 1998, 12 July 1999, 30 November 1999, 8 May 
2000, 17 January 2001 and 16 January 2002. The Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002. 
47 There were critical voices concerning the creation of the Elements of Crimes. One delegate at the Rome 
Diplomatic Conference in 1998 emphasised that the principle of legality — expressed by nullum crimen 
sine lege, nulla poena sine lege — results in that the elements of crimes must not be left to a later stage. 
State parties must be sure of the commitments that they were undertaking, see Bassiouni (n 24) 292, fn 40. 
48 Apartheid was referred to as an example of an ’act’ in the meaning of an attack as a ’multiple 
commission of acts’ (chapeau of Art 7 in conjunction with Art 7(2)(a) Rome Statute) by the ICTR in two 
judgments, an attack can also be non-violent in nature, such as the imposition of a system of apartheid on 
a people (ICTR, The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu (Trial Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998), 
para 581, and The Prosecutor v Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda (Trial Judgment) ICTR-96-3-T 
(26 May 2003) para 69.) 
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Convention on the Law of Treaties will be applied, in particular the literal, the 
contextual/systematic and the teleological criteria.49 Article 31(1) Vienna Convention 
notes that terms are to be given their ordinary meaning in the context and the light of 
the respective treaty’s object and purpose. While the ordinary meaning of treaty terms 
always is linked with its context, it may be treated separately for analytical purposes.50 
The following subchapters examine the different elements of the actus reus of the crime 
of apartheid. In so doing, the challenges — or pitfalls — of the criminal provision on 
apartheid will be revealed. Each respective subchapter deals with one of these elements, 
these being: inhumane acts, a character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, an 
institutionalised regime, systematic oppression and domination and, lastly, the racial 
group. 
3.2.1. Inhumane Acts 
The expression ‘inhumane acts’ is not defined and clearly any of the offences specified as 
crimes against humanity in Article 7(1) Rome Statute would amount to an inhumane act. 
Most likely there is an overlap between the concept of ‘inhumane acts’ (Article 7(2)(h) 
Rome Statute) and ‘inhuman acts’ (Article II Apartheid Convention), though generally 
the acts would have to reach a certain degree of severity, suffering or injury.51 Footnote 
29 in the Elements of Crime on Article 7(1)(j) Rome Statute indicates that the term 
‘character’ refers to the nature and gravity of the acts, meaning that an act similar in 
quality or seriousness to other crimes against humanity could also constitute an 
inhumane act for the purpose of this offence.52 
3.2.2. Character Similar to those Referred to in Paragraph 1 
The Rome Statutes’ Elements of Crime to Article 7(2)(h) reads as follows: 
Such act was an act referred to in article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute, or 
was an act of a character similar to any of those acts.53 
Article 7(2)(h) Rome Statute requires that the act is of an inhumane character similar to 
other crimes against humanity set forth in its Article 7(1). In practice, there may be a 
large degree of similarity between the inhumane acts of the crime of apartheid and the 
other crimes listed in paragraph 1.54 The act required has to be of an inhumane 
character, which seems to refer to Article 7(1)(k) Rome Statute, describing ‘other 
                                                        
49 Arts 31-33 of the Vienna Convention articulate the general principles of interpretation in the 
international legal system and form a part of customary law (Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea Bissau 
v Senegal), ICJ Reports (1991), 70. 
50 Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (OUP, Oxford 2008) 162. 
51 Hall (n 33) 264. 
52 <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-
45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf> accessed 30 October 2015. See also Byron (n 9) 242. 
53 <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-
45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf> accessed 28 October 2015. 
54 Clark (n 41) 88. 
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inhumane acts’ as acts that intentionally cause great suffering or serious injury to body 
or to mental or physical health. However, such acts could also fall under the definition of 
the crime of persecution in Article 7(1)(h) Rome Statute, if they contain a discriminative 
intent based on the identity of a group, for example a racial group.55 There is seemingly a 
real risk that the acts committed would be subsumed under any of the other paragraphs 
of Article 7(1) Rome Statute, thereby making the provision on the crime of apartheid 
obsolete. However, the principle of specificity, which emanates from the guiding 
principle of legality or nullum crimen sine lege, demands for criminal provisions to be as 
specific and clear as for judges to render consistent, coherent and foreseeable judgments 
and for perpetrators to foresee the consequences of their criminal behaviour. 
Punishment may only be imposed if the criminal provision that foresees punishment for 
a specific behaviour is sufficiently precise.56 Thus, in criminal law the specificity of a 
provision is of paramount importance. The more specific and precise a criminal norm is, 
the more likely it is to be in coherence with the principle of legality. It could therefore be 
argued that a detailed provision, such as Article 7(2)(h) Rome Statute, is more likely to 
adhere to the principle of legality than a generic provision such as Article 7(1)(k) Rome 
Statute. The question of whether a comprehensive provision is more likely to lead to a 
conviction in a criminal trial before an international tribunal is yet another, completely 
different and primarily pragmatic, issue. 
Understandably, the reference to ‘acts of a character similar to paragraph 1’ has caused 
some debate amongst legal academics. Sunga welcomed the Rome Statute’s definition of 
the crime of apartheid with its rather short reference to acts in Article 7(1), 
consequently omitting the long and vague list of acts found in Article II of the Apartheid 
Convention.57 As a matter of fact, most of the acts listed in the Apartheid Convention are 
captured by the Rome Statute’s definition; the list in the Apartheid Convention could 
therefore serve as illustration for the ICC when dealing with the crime of apartheid.58 
Werle suggests that ‘inhumane acts of a similar character’ could be interpreted using 
Article II Apartheid Convention.59 Cryer clarifies that the term ‘of a character similar to 
                                                        
55 Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (Intersentia, Antwerpen 2002) 529. 
56 Shahabuddeen, Mohamed, ‘Does the Principle of Legality Stand in the Way of Progressive Development 
of Law?’, (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1008 with reference to ICTY, The Prosecutor v 
Vasiljević, Case No IT-98-32T, Trial Judgment (29 November 2002) para 193. 
57 These acts include: ’denial (…) of the right to life and liberty of person‘ (lit a), which are ‘(…) murder 
(…)’(i), (…) ’infliction (…) of serious bodily or mental harm, (…) infringement of (…) freedom or dignity, or 
(…) torture, (…) cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment‘ (ii), (…) arbitrary arrest and illegal 
imprisonment (…)’ (iii); ’deliberate imposition (…) of living conditions calculated to cause (…) physical 
destruction‘ (lit b); ’any legislative measures and other measures calculated to prevent (…) from 
participation in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the country (…)’ (lit c); ’any measures (…) 
designed to divide the population along racial lines (…)’ (lit d); ’exploitation of labour (…)’ (lit 
e); ’persecution of organizations and persons (…)’ (lit f). 
See also Lyal S Sunga, ‘The Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court’ (1998) 6 Eur 
J Crime Crim L & Crim Just 391. 
58 Robert Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2010) 264; Kittichaisaree (n 4) 125. 
59 Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2005) 262—263. 
Carola Lingaas - The Crime against Humanity of Apartheid in a Post-Apartheid World 
   
97 
those referred to in paragraph 1’ was included in order to prevent exceedance of the 
existing law; the Rome Statute thus simply provided an express recognition of the crime 
of apartheid.60  
The above-cited suggestions by legal scholars reveal the ambiguity caused by the 
wording of Article 7(1) Rome Statute. The wording of ‘acts similar to those referred to in 
paragraph 1 of Article 7’ is indeed not helpful in clarifying the content of the crime of 
apartheid. On the contrary, the reference is unclear, since it seems to point to Article 
7(1)(k) Rome Statute without stating this explicitly. However, Article 7(1)(k) Rome 
Statute is also a rather open provision lacking a closer definition. There is therefore a 
substantial risk that a prosecutor would choose not to indict a perpetrator for the crime 
of apartheid because it creates an additional burden of proof. In addition to proving that 
there is an ‘inhumane act of a character similar to those referred to in Article 7(1)’, the 
prosecutor would also have to demonstrate the existence of a ‘context of an 
institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group 
over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining 
that regime’. Or instead, the prosecutor could choose to indict an alleged offender of 
Article 7(1)(k) Rome Statute, thereby limiting his burden of proof to an inhumane act. 
Nevertheless, although apartheid could fall within the ambit of ‘other inhumane acts’, it 
was included into the Rome Statute as a separate offence in order to reaffirm the 
universal condemnation of its practice.61 
3.2.3. Institutionalised Regime 
The inclusion of the term ‘institutionalized regime’ represents the most significant 
difference between the definition of the crime of apartheid in the Apartheid Convention 
and the Rome Statute.62 The 1996 Draft Code of Crimes by the ILC argued that the crime 
of persecution and the crime of institutionalised discrimination (or apartheid under a 
more general denomination) differed inasmuch as the latter demanded a plan or a policy 
to have been ‘institutionalized’.63 Whether this discrimination should be enforced by de 
jure authority (eg legal decrees) or simply by de facto actions, is not apparent from the 
statutory provision in the Rome Statute; it should be ascertained that a de facto 
discrimination would be sufficient.64 
With regards to the term ‘regime’, a broad interpretation is demanded. Hall suggests 
that regime be understood in a broad sense of ‘a method or a system of organising or 
doing something’,65 as opposed to its primary sense of a governmental method or 
system. He concludes that there are no indications in the Rome Statute that would 
                                                        
60 Cryer et al (n 58) 264. 
61 Bantekas (n 14,)194. 
62 Cryer et al (n 58) 264—265. 
63  <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/7_4_1996.pdf>, 49, accessed 30 
October 2015.  
64 Bultz (n 16) 223—224. 
65 Hall (n 33) 264—265. 
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prevent a broader interpretation of the term to include a system institutionalised by an 
armed group in control of a certain area, thereby allowing an armed group to qualify as a 
regime.66 Byron confirms this view, emphasising that ‘institutionalized regime can be 
understood as an established law or practice by a government or prevailing order’,67 
thereby confirming the de facto institutionalisation. According to other scholars, the 
crime of apartheid effectively required a government policy of apartheid.68 Bultz claims 
that a ‘regime’ should be limited to a recognisable state, the threshold of an 
institutionalised regime would be muddled if it included de facto control by loosely 
organised militias or rebel groups. He asserts that by construing the ‘regime’ notion too 
widely, it became too ambiguous and unidentifiable and therefore problematic in light of 
the principle of legality. According to Bultz, a non-state regime is not really 
institutionalised at all; instead he believes that any non-institutionalised discrimination 
would be covered by the crime of persecution and need not be embraced as a crime of 
apartheid.69 
An established law or practice by a government or prevailing order is most likely the 
closest to a definition of an institutionalised regime one gets.70 An institutionalised 
regime would indisputably exist when the oppression and the domination are anchored 
in domestic law, with the South African apartheid legislation as the prime example.71 
One must, however, be cautious so as not to demand the same requirements for a 
contemporary apartheid situation. The threshold is created by the institutionalisation of 
a regime of systematic discrimination and oppression, not by a comparison to the 
governmental methods and legislation of the Union of South Africa. 
3.2.4. Systematic Oppression and Domination 
The criterion of systematic oppression by the regime suggests that there exists some 
controlling and harsh treatment of the racial group. Yet, precisely this requirement of 
systematicity of the treatment could present considerable challenges for the prosecution 
to prove.72 The problem is created by the chapeau for all crimes against humanity in 
Article 7(1) Rome Statute that only disjunctively requires a systematic or widespread 
attack. Article 7(2)(h) Rome Statute thus seemingly introduces a mandatory 
requirement of systematicity, which contradicts the chapeau’s intention. While case law 
and scholarship have determined that crimes against humanity no longer demand a 
conjunctive requirement of a widespread and systematic attack,73 Article 7(2)(h) Rome 
                                                        
66 ibid. 
67 Byron (n 9) 242. 
68 McCormack (n 36) 200. 
69 See Bultz (n 16) 225, 229 stating that the concept was overly broad and inoperable. 
70 Byron (n 9) 242. 
71 Werle (n 59) 263. 
72 Byron (n 9) 242. 
73 See for example ICTY, The Prosecutor v Tadić, Trial Judgment, Case IT-94-1-T (7 May 1997), paras 646-
648 (‘numerous other sources support the conclusion that widespreadness and systematicity are 
alternatives’, ibid, para 647); Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent International 
Criminal Court, UN Doc A/50/22 (1995) 17. 
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Statute seemingly re-introduces this out-dated requirement, thereby countermanding 
the development of international criminal law. 
There is some uncertainty as to the distinction between ‘oppression’ and ‘domination’. 
Some scholars suggest that they cannot be distinguished and are essentially the same.74 
The Oxford English dictionary defines ‘oppression’ as ‘prolonged cruel or unjust 
treatment or exercise of authority’75, whereas ‘domination’ is described as ‘the exercise 
of power or influence over someone or something, or the state of being so controlled’.76 
It has been pointed out that there would be a significant burden on the prosecution to 
demonstrate the existence of both ‘oppression’ and ‘domination’.77 However, if these 
requirements were viewed as one – ‘oppression and domination’ – then the 
prosecutorial burden would to a certain extent be relieved. 
3.2.5. Domination of One Racial Group Over Any Other Racial Group 
The crime of apartheid is defined as an institutionalised regime of systematic oppression 
and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups. The 
construction of a ‘racial group’ is fundamental to the concept of apartheid.78 If the 
prosecutor cannot prove the existence of a racial group, the crime of apartheid becomes 
untenable. 
The crime of apartheid has certain elements in common with the crime of genocide. The 
latter protects a racial group as one of four exclusive victim groups in the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) and the 
corresponding Article 6 Rome Statute. The Apartheid Convention was, as a matter of fact, 
modelled after the Genocide Convention.79 The relevant jurisprudence on genocide with 
regard to a racial group might indeed prove useful when defining the term ‘race’ within 
the context of the crime of apartheid.80 However, while the crime of genocide protects 
four distinct groups (racial, ethnical, national and religious), the crime of apartheid 
limits its protection to the racial group only. The legal definition of the racial group 
therefore becomes of paramount importance. The classification of the victims as 
members of a racial group constitutes a legal threshold, which must be proven in order 
for the crime of apartheid to occur.81 
The common meaning of the term ‘race’ has changed considerably since the end of 
World War II. At that time, the common understanding of race merged the notion of 
                                                        
74 Hall (n 33) 265 at n 123. 
75 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/oppression, accessed 23 November 2015. 
76 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/domination, accessed 23 November 2015. 
77 Hall (n 33) 265 at n 123. 
78 Du Plessis (n 13) 425. 
79 Reydams (n 13) 59. The Rome Statute defines genocide in its Art 6: ‘For the purpose of this Statute, 
‘genocide’ means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such (…)’. 
80 Bantekas (n 14) 237. 
81 In agreement: Du Plessis (n 13) 425. 
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nation states with sub-groups of people.82 The classification of sub-groups with different 
inherent, unchangeable characteristics was part of Hitler’s Aryan master race policy. His 
creation of a homogenous German people (the so-called Herrenvolk or Herrenrasse) was 
an attempt to justify the extermination of ‘others’ as a sacred purpose of the biologically 
superior German people.83 The Nazi party ‘embarked on a lethal project of social 
engineering that was to eliminate “impure” groups that threatened the Aryan race’.84 
However the concept of race is also burdened by an out-dated pseudo-scientific 
explanation dating back to times of imperialism and colonialism asserting that 
people can be categorised by their features and innate characteristics. Natural sciences 
have long reached the conclusion that there are no genetic or biological differences 
amongst the different races.85 Moreover, it has become accepted that race is the outcome 
of collective ascription and is typically used to refer to a group of people who are 
perceived as being different and possibly inferior to another group.86 Thus, race is 
created by a specific society in order to indicate and justify differences in treatment or in 
position.87 Already in 1950, the UNESCO Statement on Race emphasised that ‘[f]or all 
practical social purposes, “race” is not so much a biological phenomenon as a social 
myth’.88 Since obviously ‘the existence of races themselves no longer corresponds to 
usage of progressive social science’,89 race as a means to classify humans into major 
subspecies has become virtually obsolete.90 
Modern genetics tend not to speak of race for three predominant reasons: first, there has 
been so much interbreeding between human populations that there are no pure racial 
groups. Secondly, hereditary physical traits are not evenly distributed within clear 
boundaries. Lastly, hereditary characteristics cannot explain cultural variations. People 
                                                        
82 The creator of the term ‘genocide’, Raphael Lemkin, discusses in a subchapter entitled ‘Racial 
Differentiation’ in his seminal work ‘Axis Rule in Occupied Europe’, the differences in wages paid to 
German construction workers compared to Eastern workers or Jews, implying that Germans, Poles, 
Ukrainians, White Russians and Jews were all members of different races (Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in 
Occupied Europe (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington 1944) 70—71). 
83 Henry Jr King, ‘Genocide and Nuremberg’ in Ralph Henham, Paul Behrens, Paul (eds), The Criminal Law 
of Genocide (Ashgate Publishing Company, Aldershot 2007) 30. 
84 Alexander Laban Hinton, ‘The Dark Side of Modernity: Toward an Anthropology of Genocide’, in 
Alexander Laban Hinton, Annihilating Difference: An Anthropology of Genocide (Blackwell Publishers, 
Malden 2002) 14. 
85 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism (3rd edn Pluto Press, London 2010) 5; Erica Howard, 
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Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations (2008) 10. 
86 Walter Kälin and Jörg Künzli, The Law of International Human Rights Protection (OUP, Oxford 2009) 369. 
87 Hylland Eriksen, (n 85) 5; Howard (n 85) 10; David Davis, ‘Constructing Race: A Reflection’ in The 
William and Mary Quarterly, vol 54 (1997) 7; Gudrun Holgersen, ‘Etnisk diskriminering’ [Ethnic 
Discrimination] in Anne Hellum, Kirsten Ketscher (eds), Diskriminerings- og likestillingsrett 
[Discrimination and equality law] (Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 2008) 159. 
88 1950 UNESCO Statement on Race, in UNESCO, Four Statements on the Race Question (1969) 33. The 
1967 UNESCO Statement on Race and Racial Prejudice confirms that ‘racist doctrines lack any scientific 
basis whatsoever’ (ibid 50). 
89 Schabas (n 29) 142. 
90 William Schabas, Genocide in International Law (1st edn Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000) 
129. 
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everywhere in the world have the same inborn abilities and variations exist only on an 
individual level, not at a group level.91 
When confronted with the definition of the term ‘racial group’ (mostly in connection to 
defining the protected racial group of the crime of genocide), international criminal 
tribunals were challenged with finding an objective definition of the protected group.92 
The reason for this approach is the fact that the racial group is an element of the 
actus reus, a threshold of the crime. Consequently, the international criminal 
tribunals tried to objectively define race, with rather mixed results. Gradually, 
however, there has been a shift towards a subjective approach, thereby avoiding 
scientifically verifiable (objective) parameters and instead relying on the persecutor’s 
perception of the victim group.93 
While international criminal law seemingly tries to avoid any confrontation with race 
and racial groups, socio-anthropology extensively dealt with the issue and commonly 
defines race as the perception of differentness.94 Noticing this, legal scholars have 
suggested turning to anthropology in search of a legal definition of race: 
[A]partheid constitutes a very specific crime against humanity, based 
solely on racial discrimination. It is relevant even after the collapse of the 
South African apartheid State, and much will depend on the 
anthropological definition of ‘race’.95 
According to the contemporary socio-anthropological definition of race, the only matter 
of importance is whether social actors treat races as real and organise their lives and 
exclusionary practices accordingly. Race is therefore a social construct, defined and 
moulded by a group, usually in response to another group. Race is heavily influenced 
and ultimately created by stigmatisation and the perception of differentness. Race is 
thus not real, but imagined. As mentioned earlier, the perpetrator’s perception becomes 
the main determining element: people discriminate because someone is perceived as 
being different.96 In other words, if a group is perceived and treated as a distinct racial 
group, it would qualify as a racial group in the meaning of the crime of apartheid, despite 
the lack of any ‘objective’ differences between the groups to which the victim and the 
perpetrator belong to. 
 
                                                        
91 Hylland Eriksen (n 85) 6. Also noted by Kälin and Künzli (n 86) 368. 
92 In Akayesu, the ICTR Trial Chamber defined a racial group as ‘based on the hereditary physical traits 
often identified with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors’ 
(ICTR, The Prosecutor v Akayesu, Case No 96-4-T, Trial Judgment (2 September 1998), para 514.  
93 William Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (4th edn Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2011) 105. 
94 Lyal Sunga, The Emerging System of International Criminal Law: Developments in Codification and 
Implementation (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1997) 112. 
95 Bantekas (n 14) 237.  
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3.3. The Mens Rea of the Crime against Humanity of Apartheid 
In addition to the specific intention of maintaining an institutionalised regime of 
systematic oppression and domination, Article 30 Rome Statute requires that the 
perpetrator commits the material elements with intent and knowledge. Thus, the mens 
rea of the crime of apartheid demands awareness by the perpetrator of the factual 
circumstances, such as the nature and gravity of his or her acts, and an intention of 
maintaining the institutionalised regime of systematic oppression and domination over 
a racial group. Of importance is that the systematic oppression and domination not only 
have the effect, but moreover the purpose of maintaining a regime by one racial group 
over another racial group. The crime of apartheid therefore demands a special intent to 
sustain an institutionalised system of racial discrimination, in addition to the general 
intent of committing the crime.97 
The wording of the mens rea is problematic because it seemingly excludes acts that 
establish a racial domination; according to the provision’s wording, the criminal act is 
limited to maintaining such regimes.98 However, it could be argued that any regime, 
once established, also has to be maintained. Furthermore, the wording suggests that 
replacing one regime with another is not included.99 A possible solution to this apparent 
lacuna could be found in a wide definition of the maintenance term as to include the 
establishment and the replacement of an apartheid regime, thereby approaching Article 
II Apartheid Convention that demands intent ‘for the purpose of establishing and 
maintaining domination’. 
3.4. Spatial Applicability of the Provisions on Apartheid 
While there are controversies as to whether the Apartheid Convention was intended for, 
and could be applied to, contexts other than South Africa, this discussion is no longer 
valid for the Rome Statute. Since Article 7(1)(j) in conjunction with Article 7(2)(h) Rome 
Statute removed any reference to Southern Africa; accordingly, the Southern African 
situation can no longer be used as a conditio sine qua non to determine the existence of 
the crime of apartheid in other cases. The crime of apartheid has been released from its 
former geographical shackles. The provisions on apartheid in the Rome Statute can 
therefore be applied to any situation occurring in the territory of any State party. They 
can furthermore be applied to any other state providing the ICC’s jurisdiction is accepted 
and/or the UN Security Council authorises the initiation of an investigation. 
Nonetheless, the contentiousness of the spatial (and temporal) applicability of the Rome 
Statute’s provisions on apartheid has not yet fully dissipated. The shadow of the South 
African legacy still lingers over the crime of apartheid. Yet, with the inclusion of the 
                                                        
97 Du Plessis (n 13) 427; Bantekas (n 14) 48. This ‘special intent’ should, however, not be confused with 
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crime of apartheid into the Rome Statute and the removal of any reference to the 
Southern African case, the time has now come to put Article 7(1)(j) Rome Statute to the 
test. As a matter of fact, there are a significant number of States with institutionalised 
regimes of systematic oppression and domination. If these cases reach the threshold of a 
crime against humanity and fulfil the elements of the crime of apartheid, a substantial 
number of cases could be added to the ICC’s case-load.100 Two cases will be briefly 
analysed in Chapter 5, demonstrating that the provisions on apartheid could be applied 
by the ICC in the near future. 
 
4. The Status of Apartheid in Customary Law 
There are three possible sources under international law, namely treaty, custom and 
general principles of law. 101  Customary law demands evidence of a subjective 
recognition by states of what they consider to be a binding rule of international law 
(opinio juris) as well as an objective constant and uniform state practice.102 International 
crimes are mostly created through conventions, but also through custom. The 
contentiousness of the Apartheid Convention and the not yet universal ratification of the 
Rome Statute as treaty sources containing the crime against humanity of apartheid, 
reveal the importance of the customary status of this crime. The Rome Statute attempted 
to codify pre-existing customary or conventional law, particularly crimes that were 
already prohibited in codified international law, such as the crime of apartheid.103 The 
crimes listed in the Rome Statute thus coincide to a large extent with customary law.104 
Whether or not the crime against humanity of apartheid has reached customary law 
status remains an issue of dispute.105 This chapter will attempt to demonstrate why the 
crime of apartheid is not only a treaty crime, but most probably also a customary crime. 
4.1. The Prohibition of Racial Discrimination 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the South West Africa case made clear that ‘the 
norm of non-discrimination or non-separation on the basis of race has become a rule of 
                                                        
100 Hall (n 33) 229. 
101 1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art 38(1)(b) and (c). 
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104 Rodney Dixon and Christopher Hall, ‘Crimes against Humanity’, in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on 
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customary international law’.106 Not only norms proscribing racial discrimination, but 
also governmental practices of systematic racial discrimination are considered 
prohibited under customary human rights law.107 Apartheid is a case of qualified racial 
discrimination that runs contrary to the most fundamental guiding principles of 
international law, notably human rights law: the UN Charter of 1945 provides in Article 
1(3) that its members had to promote and encourage ‘respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion’ 
(emphasis added). Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 
confirms that ‘everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’ 
(Article 2, emphasis added). The customary law status of the prohibition of racial 
discrimination and apartheid as a case of qualified racial discrimination seems 
uncontested. Indeed, scholars confirm that ‘the customary status of the prohibition of 
( …) systematic apartheid-style racial discrimination is ( …) beyond doubt’.108 While the 
customary nature of racial non-discrimination is recognised, the question remains 
whether the crime against humanity of apartheid is a customary norm too. 
4.2. Opinio juris 
Evidence of opinio juris will often be drawn from debates in the General Assembly or 
from negotiation of international treaties, where the opinion of states on their legal 
obligations becomes apparent.109 The ICJ in the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons 
recognised that also General Assembly resolutions, even if they were not legally binding, 
could in certain circumstances provide evidence of an opinio juris.110 This statement is of 
particular importance for the examination of the customary nature of the crime of 
apartheid. 
No court has ever prosecuted the crime of apartheid (national or international); no 
person has ever been tried for the crime of apartheid.111 Therefore the state practice of 
criminal prosecution of this crime is non-existent. Nevertheless, apartheid has been 
dealt with by virtually every organ of the UN, since the very beginning of the 
organisation’s existence in 1946. It was apartheid that unified the international 
community in its struggle to bring to an end the South African regime in the midst of the 
Cold War era. Numerous UN resolutions condemned apartheid, an indication of its 
                                                        
106 South West Africa Case (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa), Second Phase, Judgment of 18 
July 1966, ICJ Reports 1966, 293 (Dissenting Opinion by Judge Tanaka). 
107 The American Law Institute affirmed this in its Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States (1986): ‘racial discrimination is a violation of customary law when it is practiced systematically as a 
matter of state policy’ (para 165). Confirmed by Thomas Buergenthal, Dinah Shelton, David Stewart, 
International Human Rights - In a Nutshell (3rd edn West Group, St. Paul 2002) 42. 
108 Kälin and Künzli (n 86) 70. 
109 William Schabas, ‘The Contribution of the Eichmann Trial to International Law’ (2013) 26 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 691. 
110 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, para 70, 254—55. 
111 Zahar (n 15) 245; Reydams (n 13) 60. 
Carola Lingaas - The Crime against Humanity of Apartheid in a Post-Apartheid World 
   
105 
seriousness. Indeed, in the period from 1946 to 1993, at least 14 General Assembly 
resolutions confirmed apartheid to be a crime against humanity; in addition to a 
multitude of other resolutions dealing with the consequences of the South African 
apartheid regime. Furthermore, on one occasion the Security Council affirmed that 
apartheid was a crime against humanity, as well as once stating that apartheid was a 
‘crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind’.112 Although purely related to the 
Southern African context, these UN resolutions shaped the understanding of the crime of 
apartheid and continue to be relevant with regards to its legal definition. From an 
historical perspective, these resolutions are of great importance because they illustrate 
the international community’s commitment to eradicate and to criminalise apartheid. 
From a legal point of view, the resolutions show how apartheid grew to be recognised as 
a crime against humanity and demonstrate an opinio juris of the UN member states. If 
this opinio juris can be attributed with the corresponding state practice, the crime of 
apartheid could have actually gained customary law status. 
The International Law Commission (ILC) seems to further strengthen this argument. In 
its recent Report on the Formation and Evidence of Customary Law of 2013, it noted 
that the prohibition against racial discrimination and apartheid were peremptory norms, 
which were formed as a result of a process of widespread acceptance and recognition by 
the international community as a whole.113 The condemnation of apartheid as a crime 
against humanity and as such an affront to human dignity by ‘the majority of Member 
states’ was already noted as early as 1972.114 There are therefore strong indications that 
an opinio juris as to the prohibition of apartheid as a crime against humanity exists, and 
has existed, for more than four decades. 
4.3. State Practice 
An increasing number of national legislations now contain the crime of apartheid, which 
demonstrates the general high acceptance of the crime and state practice as such.115 On 
the international level, there are a multitude of treaties with provisions on apartheid. As 
a matter of fact, all the international treaties that contain provisions on apartheid have 
reached a high number of ratifications, thereby indicating state practice: 176 States are 
members of the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD). According to the Preamble of the ICERD, its State parties were: 
alarmed (…) by manifestations of racial discrimination still in evidence in some 
areas of the world and by governmental policies based on racial superiority or 
                                                        
112 UNSC Resolution 556 (23 October 1984) and UN Security Council Resolution 392 (19 June 1976).  
113 ILC, ‘Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law’ (14 March 2013) UN Doc A/CN.4/659 
29-30. 
114 Statement by Mr AA Farah before the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly on 9 October 
1972, Unit on Apartheid, Doc No 20/72 (October 1972) 7. 
115 See for example the legislation of Australia, Canada, Congo, Mali, New Zealand and United Kingdom or 
the draft legislation of Burundi and Trinidad and Tobago. In addition, numerous states have included 
apartheid as a war crime into their military manuals <http://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule88 - Fn_19_15> accessed 28 October 2015. 
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hatred, such as policies of apartheid, segregation or separation’ (emphasis 
added).116 
Article 3 further stipulates the member States’ obligation to oppose apartheid: 
States Parties particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid and 
undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature in 
territories under their jurisdiction. 
It is to be noted that the discriminatory practice of apartheid was the only specific form 
of discrimination to be singled out and proscribed in its own treaty provision in the 
ICERD. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions with an article on the war crime 
of apartheid also achieved a high number of ratifications, with 173 State parties. The 
Rome Statute has to date been ratified by 122 States. The Rome negotiations for the ICC 
reaffirmed that apartheid is a crime against humanity — certain scholars perceive this 
as confirmation that the crime has achieved a customary law status.117 Last but not least, 
the Apartheid Convention with 109 ratifications confirms a generally high 
acknowledgement of apartheid as an international crime.118 Undoubtedly, the majority 
of ratifications occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. However, a not insignificant 
number of these took place in the early 1990s, thus in the final years of the South African 
apartheid regime.119 Even more remarkable is that a total of 10 States either ratified or 
acceded the Apartheid Convention after the fall of the regime in 1994, the latest being in 
2014 (State of Palestine).120 These recent ratifications demonstrate that the Apartheid 
Convention is perceived as a valid, functioning treaty and possibly not a dead letter after 
all. 
There are furthermore no indications of hostility to the apartheid provisions by states 
that are not parties to the above-listed treaties. A clear signal is also the acceptance of 
subsequent instruments prohibiting apartheid by previous non-state parties to the 
Apartheid Convention (such as South Africa or the United Kingdom). The prohibition of 
racial discrimination itself is a clear rule of customary law. The prohibition of apartheid 
as a qualified example of racial discrimination, constituting an international crime, is 
                                                        
116 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by General 
Assembly resolution 2106 A (XX) of 21 December 1965. 
117 Bantekas, Nash (n 39) 135. 
118 A frequently voiced criticism against the Apartheid Convention is the low number of State parties it has. 
However, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a yardstick in international law, has only five 
more parties (113 ratifications).  
119 From 1990 until 1994, a total of nine States became party to the Apartheid Convention: Armenia, 
Bahrain, Bosnia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Oman and Zimbabwe. See 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-7&chapter=4&lang=en,> 
accessed 10 November 2015. 
120 The newest State parties can be grouped according to their region of origin: Azerbaijan (1996), Georgia 
(2005), Republic of Moldova (2005) as a group of countries from the Caucasus region. Guatemala (2005), 
Honduras (2005), Paraguay (2005), and Uruguay (2012) are all from Central and South America. 
Furthermore, Montenegro (2006) and Serbia (2001) succeeded to the Convention, representing parts of 
the Balkan. The State of Palestine (2014) was the latest state to accede to the Convention. 
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recognised by an increasing number of states and can therefore be asserted to have 
reached the level of customary law.121 
4.4. Erga omnes, jus cogens and universal jurisdiction 
In its famous Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ declared that not only was racial 
discrimination prohibited by international customary law, it was also a norm erga omnes: 
Such obligations (obligations erga omnes) derive, for example, in 
contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, 
and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic 
rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial 
discrimination.122 
The judgment defines obligations erga omnes as follows: 
In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the 
obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and 
those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. 
By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the 
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal 
interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.123 
The wording very much resembles that which the ILC later adopted in its Draft Code of 
Crimes, in which it is emphasised that apartheid was of particular gravity due to its 
heinous nature. Moreover, it involved mass and systematic violations of universal 
values.124 Owing to the gravity of the crime and the damage caused to humanity as a 
whole, there is an obligation owned to the international community to not discriminate 
on a racial basis. 
Not only has apartheid reached the status of customary law and is a crime with an erga 
omnes effect, it is also an international crime with jus cogens status.125 Jus cogens permits 
states to assert universal jurisdiction over core international crimes. Crimes against 
humanity, amongst these, apartheid, have been recognised in international law for 
                                                        
121 Confirmed by Du Plessis (n 13) 421—422. 
122 Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain). Judgment 
5 February 1970, ICJ Reports 1970, para 34. 
123 ibid, para 33. 
124See Chapter 3.1. on the ILC Drafting history, as well as: 
http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_442.pdf&lang=EFS, (55, paras 38—
40) accessed 30 October 2015.  
125 ILC, ‘Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law’ (14 March 2013) UN Doc A/CN.4/659 
29-30. See also M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Crimes: The Ratione Materiae of International Criminal 
Law’ in M Cherif Bassiouni (ed), International Criminal Law (3rd edn Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 
2008) 138. 
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several decades and could be a prime example for universal jurisdiction.126 As a matter 
of fact, the South African apartheid regime prominently figured as a potential case of 
universal jurisdiction prior to the ratification of the Rome Statute: the government 
committed crimes against its own citizens, but had not ratified the Apartheid Convention 
and was therefore not directly bound by its provisions. The Convention aimed at halting 
the practice of a non-state party, which could only have been achieved by exercising 
universal jurisdiction.127 Unfortunately, due to the lack of case law, it is currently rather 
unlikely that any state will assert universal jurisdiction for the crime of apartheid. 
 
5. Application to Contexts other than South Africa 
While none of the current situations under investigation before the ICC deal with the 
crime of apartheid, there are indications that other situations might indeed fulfil the 
requirements of the crime.128 In particular, the situation in Palestine, presently under 
preliminary examination by the ICC, may call for the application of the provisions on 
apartheid, as will subsequently be shown. The other recent situation, to which the 
apartheid terminology was applied in at least a partially legal sense, is North Korea. The 
following sub-chapters will discuss both cases, without however going into depth 
regarding the underlying facts. 
5.1. North Korea 
The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) was established by the UN Commission on Human Rights as 
early as 2004 (based upon UN Human Rights Council Resolution 2004/13). The 
rapporteur’s mandate has since been renewed on an annual basis by the Human Rights 
Council. While the office of the Special Rapporteur has existed for more than a decade, it 
                                                        
126 Bassiouni (n 13) 237; Julia Selman-Ayetey, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Conflict and Controversy in Norway’ 
in Kevin Jon Heller and Gerry Simpson (eds), The Hidden Histories of War Crimes Trials (OUP, Oxford 2013) 
278—279. 
127 Daniel Derby and M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Final Report on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court for the Implementation of the Apartheid Convention and Other Relevant Instruments’ (1980-1981) 
9 Hofstra Law Review 530-531. 
128 In the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the case of The Prosecutor v Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo (Case No ICC-01/04-01/06) there were discussions regarding reparations that referred to 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of South Africa following the abolishment of the apartheid 
regime (see eg Trial Chamber I, ‘Submission on Reparations Issues’, 10 May 2012, paras 26-28). These 
discussions did, however, not refer to the crime against humanity of apartheid. The same goes for the 
situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the case of The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Case 
No ICC-01/04-01/07) that also discussed the reparations recommended by the TRC (Trial Chamber II, 
Redress Trust observations pursuant to Art 75 of the Statute, 15 May 2015, para 47). In the Situation in 
the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, in the case of The Prosecutor v Laurent Gbagbo (Case No ICC-02/11-01/11), 
the Appeals Chamber referred in a footnote to the Akayesu case before the ICTR that mentioned apartheid 
as an example of a non-violent attack (Public document with confidential Annex 1 and public Annex 2, 
Prosecution’s appeal against the ‘Decision adjourning the hearing on the confirmation of charges pursuant 
to Art 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute’, 12 August 2013, para 47, fn 97). The ICC did not perform a legal 
analysis of the crime of apartheid. 
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is only in recent years that its activity has become publicly more known. Subsequently, 
some of this recent development will be shown. 
In April 2013, the Council established a Commission of Inquiry to investigate systematic, 
widespread and grave violations of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK). The Commission was instructed to investigate, amongst other things, 
violations of the right to food, torture and inhuman treatment, discrimination, violations 
of freedom of expression and violations of the right to life. The Commission’s mandate 
was based on the Human Rights Council Resolution 22/13.129 In a public statement to 
the 25th session of the Human Rights Council in March 2014, the Chairman of the 
Commission of Inquiry, Michael Kirby, asserted that the government of North Korea had 
put into place a system of apartheid.130 The statement was released in connection with 
the publication of the corresponding report of the detailed findings of the Commission of 
Inquiry.131 The statement and the report contain multiple references to crimes against 
humanity that were —and allegedly still are — being committed by government officials 
of the DPRK against its own citizens.132 While the Commission’s report was not intended 
to be a legally binding document and makes no claims as such, it nevertheless had the 
objective of ‘ensuring full accountability, in particular where these violations may 
amount to crimes against humanity’.133 As such, the report integrates well with a 
number of recent reports by other Commissions of Inquiry. Indeed, it seemingly reveals 
a trend of non-legal commissions drawing legal conclusions without having performed a 
complete legal analysis of the crimes in question or having a corresponding mandate.134 
In his statement, Kirby makes direct reference to the apartheid regime in South Africa 
and the cruelties committed by Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.135 In so doing, he compares 
the North Korean situation with other situations of serious human rights breaches, 
where international crimes were committed. Implicitly, he thereby performs a legal 
classification of the situation in North Korea. The statement notes that the social system 
in the DPRK, the songbun, was a discriminatory apartheid of a social class that should 
immediately and completely be abolished136 Most interestingly, however, with the 
                                                        
129 UN Doc A/HRC/RES/22/13 (9 April 2013). 
130 Statement by Michael Kirby, Chair of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (17 March 2014) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14385&LangID=E> 
accessed 6 October 2015. 
131 Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (7 February 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/25/CRP.1  
132 See n 130 and 131. 
133 See n 131, para 15(c). 
134 Other examples are the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur that concluded that crimes 
against humanity had been committed, but not the crime of genocide (‘Report of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur’ [25 January 2005] UN Doc S/2005/60) as well as the Mapping Report 
on the Democratic Republic of Congo (Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003 [August 2010]).  
135 See n 130. 
136 See n 130. 
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exception of an appearance in one footnote, the comprehensive report never once 
mentions the term ‘apartheid’.137 On behalf of the Commission, Kirby urged: 
… the members of the United Nations and the international community, to 
accept their responsibility to protect and to implement all the 
recommendations contained in our report addressed to them: especially 
those related to accountability, including the referral of the situation of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the International Criminal 
Court.138 
The Commission thereby calls upon the members of the UN to refer the situation to the 
Prosecutor of the ICC.139 The statement ends with yet another comparison of the North 
Korean system with South Africa, as well as Nazism: 
Contending with the scourges of Nazism, apartheid, the Khmer Rouge and 
other affronts required courage by great nations and ordinary human 
beings alike. It is now your duty to address the scourge of human rights 
violations and crimes against humanity in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea.140 
The media were quick to pick up on one particular sentence issued by Kirby, that of the 
North Korean songbun being an apartheid system.141 Paradoxically, and as has also been 
noted above, apartheid does not figure in the report’s analysis, except for once in a 
footnote. Yet, it was this specific comparison of the North Korean totalitarian system 
with Nazism, the Khmer Rouge reign and, not least, the South African apartheid regime 
that made headlines. 
Clearly, there appears to be a discrepancy between the (legal) conclusions of the 
comprehensive report and the Chairman’s statements. Two possible reasons for this 
present themselves: either Michael Kirby carried out a personal legal analysis of the 
situation in the DPRK and concluded that the crime against humanity of apartheid was, 
in his eyes, fulfilled (a rather unlikely scenario), or, more likely, Kirby used the not 
unknown rhetoric of labelling a discriminatory situation as ‘apartheid’, without having 
performed the corresponding legal analysis. It has to be recalled that the crime of 
apartheid requires the oppression and domination by one racial group over any other 
racial group. In order to fulfil the actus reus of the crime, two (or more) different racial 
groups would have to be involved. It is, however, highly unlikely that the different social 
                                                        
137 See n 131, fn 1680. 
138 See n 130. 
139 See also n 131, paras 1218 and 1225.  
140 See n 130.  
141 See for example <http://www.thejournal.ie/un-declares-north-koreas-crimes-on-par-with-nazism-
apartheid-and-khmer-rouge-1367424-Mar2014/>; <http://www.news.com.au/world/united-nations-
north-koreas-crimes-as-bad-as-the-nazis-khmer-rouge/story-fndir2ev-1226857501872>; 
<http://www.timesofisrael.com/un-probe-likens-north-korea-to-nazis/; 
<http://www.iol.co.za/news/world/north-korea-is-a-dark-abyss-1.1662406#.VhT-D_4w85s> all 
accessed 7 October 2015.  
Carola Lingaas - The Crime against Humanity of Apartheid in a Post-Apartheid World 
   
111 
groups in North Korea would be considered ‘races’. This interpretation of the term race 
would most likely stretch its legal meaning considerably and it is doubtful whether any 
international criminal court would accept such a legal classification.  
Very recent developments reveal the likelihood of a referral of the North Korean 
situation to the ICC: at the end of October 2015, apparently a joint EU-Japanese draft 
General Assembly resolution encouraged the UN Security Council to refer the situation 
to the ICC.142 According to media, momentum was gathering as the referral became a 
real possibility and, in this context, the former UN Commissioner of Human Rights, Navi 
Pillay also emphasised that the North Korean caste system, the songbun, constituted a 
new example of apartheid.143 In their oral statements, both former and current UN 
officials have been quick to draw the comparison between the songbun system in the 
DPRK and apartheid. Conversely, they are more cautious in their written reports, where 
apartheid terminology is consistently avoided.144 In the case of an increasingly more 
likely referral of the North Korean situation to the ICC, a legal analysis of the songbun 
system as a crime against humanity of apartheid should be anticipated. However, the 
racial group is an essential element of the actus reus of the crime of apartheid and the 
social classes of the DPRK can hardly be classified as racial groups. Unless the racial 
group is very broadly interpreted to include any group perceived as being different from 
the perpetrator’s group, an application of Article 7(1)(j) Rome Statute on the situation 
seems rather unlikely. 
In summary, once again it has been shown that the symbolic power of the apartheid 
terminology cannot be underestimated. Simultaneously, this power also casts a shadow 
over the legal definition of the term. 
5.2. The Occupied Palestinian Territories 
Parallels between the South African apartheid regime and the situation in Palestine were 
drawn already at an early stage, as illustrated by the UN General Assembly Resolution 
3382 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, which strongly condemned: 
all governments which do not recognise the right to self-determination 
and independence of peoples under colonial and foreign domination and 
alien subjugation, notably the people of Africa and the Palestinian 
people.145 
                                                        
142 <http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/10/30/world/asia/ap-un-united-nations-north-korea-
rights.html?_r=1> accessed 2. November 2015. 
143 <http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2015/10/22/Ex-UN-official-North-Korean-caste-
system-is-the-new-apartheid/1571445526152/> accessed 2. November 2015. 
144 See for example A/HRC/28/71 (Report of the Special Rapporteur on DPRK, 18 March 2015), 
A/HRC/26/43 (Report of the Special Rapporteur on DPRK, 13. June 2014), A/HRC/28/L.18 (situation of 
human rights in DPRK that require the Council’s attention, 23. March 2015), A/HRC/RES/28/22 
(resolution adopted by Human Rights Council, 8. April 2015). 
145 UNGA Res 3382 (XXX) (10 November 1975), para 5. 
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The conflict in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) also prominently figures in 
the colloquial apartheid discourse. Numerous books make the connection between 
apartheid and Palestine already in their title: ‘Seeking Mandela: Peacemaking between 
Israelis and Palestinians’146 and ‘Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid’147 are just two 
examples of a wide array of scholarly publications. The apartheid terminology is 
employed as a metaphor for the on-going struggle between two groups of people and is 
as such not applied in any legal sense. Although, other sources have specifically analysed 
the situation in the OPT from a legal perspective. One of these being the Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories 
occupied since 1967, which will be discussed subsequently.148 
Richard Falk, the Special Rapporteur, presented his final report to the UN Human Rights 
Council in January 2014, submitted in accordance with the Commission on Human 
Rights resolution 1993/2A and Human Rights Council decision 2/102.149 In his report, 
Falk addressed Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the wall, in the context of the 
tenth anniversary of the Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice (ICJ),150 
and considered the policies and practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories (OPT) in light of the prohibition on segregation and apartheid. Thus, unlike 
the Commission of Inquiry to North Korea, Special Rapporteur Falk made it clear that he 
was looking into apartheid-like situations and would therefore perform a legal 
classification of the discriminatory systems put into place in the OPT.151 His report 
dedicates an entire chapter (chapter V) to the question of apartheid and segregation. 
Falk points out that he, as did his predecessors, had called for an advisory opinion by the 
ICJ on ‘whether elements of the [Israeli] occupation constitute forms of colonialism and 
apartheid’.152 However: 
since no advisory opinion has been sought ( …), in the present report the 
Special Rapporteur assumes part of the task of analysing whether 
allegations of apartheid in occupied Palestine are well founded. He 
discusses Israeli policies and practices through the lens of the 
                                                        
146 Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, Seeking Mandela: Peacemaking between Israelis and Palestinians 
(Temple University Press, Philadelphia 2005). 
147 Marwan Bishara: Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid. Prospects for Resolving the Conflict (Zed Books 
New York 2001). 
148 For a comprehensive legal analysis of the crime of apartheid in Israel/Palestine, see John Quigley, 
‘Apartheid Outside Africa: The Case of Israel’, 2 Indiana International & Comparative Law Review (1991-
1992), 221-251. 
149 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories 
occupied since 1967, Richard Falk, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/67 (13 January 2014). 
150 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion 
of 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004. 
151 The report reads: ‘An abiding theme of the reports of the Special Rapporteur during the past six years 
has been the consistent failure of Israel to comply with clear legal standards embodied in the Geneva 
Convention (…) and elsewhere in international humanitarian law and international human rights law’ (n 
149, para 3). It is to be noted that Falk is professor emeritus of law at Princeton University. 
152 n 149, para 51. 
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international prohibition of ethnic discrimination, segregation and 
apartheid.153 
By referring specifically to the international prohibition of apartheid, the legal approach 
to the discriminatory practices in the OPT is further emphasised. The term ‘prohibition’ 
implies an analysis of the criminal law provisions. Indeed, the Special Rapporteur 
meticulously enumerates the relevant legal framework for his analysis, amongst others 
Article 85(4)(c) of Protocol I under the Geneva Conventions, the peremptory status of 
the prohibition of apartheid as declared by the International Law Commission,154 Article 
3 ICERD (thoroughly elaborating that, while this provision possibly only applied to 
South Africa, the overall prohibition of racial discrimination was found to be of universal 
character) as well as the Apartheid Convention.155 Falk rightfully pinpoints the issue of 
the domination of one racial group over another racial group as one of the main 
elements – and challenges – to the application of the apartheid provisions. As such, he 
notes that racial discrimination had to be broadly defined as to include any distinction 
based on race, colour, descent, national or ethnic origin, as prescribed by Article 1 
ICERD.156 The report ends by concluding that it finds ‘practices and policies which 
appear to constitute apartheid and segregation’157 and refers to the possibility of a 
criminal investigation before the ICC.158 The media response was dominated by 
headlines on the Israeli apartheid.159 The accession of the State of Palestine to the 
Apartheid Convention only three months after Falk’s presentation of his final report is 
hardly coincidental.160 
One year after the submission of Falk’s report, the Government of Palestine lodged a 
declaration under Article 12(3) Rome Statute accepting the ICC’s jurisdiction and 
subsequently acceding to the Rome Statute.161 It is to be noted that the declaration only 
concerns alleged crimes committed since 13 June 2014. It therefore has a different 
temporal dimension than the report by Falk. The Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC had 
to, as a matter of policy and practice, open a preliminary examination into the situation 
in Palestine in order to establish whether the criteria for opening an investigation 
                                                        
153 ibid. 
154 International Law Commission (ILC), Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, with commentaries (2001), Arts 40–41 and commentaries. 
155 See n 149, para 52. 
156 See n 149, para 53. 
157 See n 149, para 78. 
158 See n 149, para 80. 
159<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/24/us-palestinians-israel-un-falk-
idUSBREA1N19I20140224>; <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/israel-guilty-ethnic-cleansing-apartheid-says-
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160 This accession on April 2, 2014 makes the State of Palestine the newest party to the Apartheid 
Convention <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
7&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 10 November 2015. 
161 <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/press/Palestine_A_12-3.pdf> (Palestinian statement) and 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr1080.aspx> 
(ICC Press Release, 5 January 2015) both accessed 9 October 2015. 
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according to Article 53(1) Rome Statute were met.162 If an investigation were to be 
opened it would be of particular interest to see whether the Office of the Prosecutor 
examines the committing of the crime of apartheid. In this context, it would prove to be 
of major importance whether or not the Palestinians and the Israeli are considered two 
distinct racial groups. If the ICC chooses to follow suit regarding the current 
development of the sociological and legal definition of race as being the perception of a 
group or a person’s differentness, then the two groups in the OPT could indeed be 
characterised as two racial groups. With reference to the rather clear conclusion of 
Falk’s report, which has a legal dimension, it would be surprising if the ICC Prosecutor 
were to disregard the application of the provision on the crime of apartheid. Further 
developments in this case are to be awaited. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The importance of the inclusion of the crime of apartheid into the Rome Statute should 
not be underestimated. Thirty years ago, the international community stood united in its 
efforts to abolish apartheid in South Africa. In the entire history of the United Nations, 
there has rarely been such a widespread agreement on the wrongfulness of a situation. 
Nevertheless, perpetrators of apartheid were not held accountable, despite international 
condemnation and the creation of an international treaty criminalising apartheid. 
Although prohibited and criminalised by international law as early as 1976, when the 
Apartheid Convention came into force, the crime of apartheid has never been given 
sufficient attention by international lawyers. The open criticism towards the Convention, 
seemingly exclusively applicable to the South African situation, in effect led to impunity. 
With the end of the South African apartheid regime, many believed there would be no 
other cases of apartheid. The crime of apartheid fell into oblivion. The inclusion of the 
crime in the Rome Statute is a confirmation of its legitimate space in international 
criminal law. 
It should not be forgotten that of all types of discrimination, it was apartheid that 
developed a unique dynamic: in addition to being listed in several other instruments,163 
it is the subject of two international treaties,164 proscribed with individual criminality, 
jus cogens status, universal jurisdiction and finally found its way into the Rome Statute. 
Had the international community not believed in the continued relevance of the crime of 
apartheid, it could have chosen not to include it into the Rome Statute. Instead, the 
delegates to the Rome Diplomatic Conference165 spoke with a clear voice: no impunity 
                                                        
162<http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr1083.asp
x> accessed 9 October 2015. 
163 Art 85(4)(c) Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, Art 3 International Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination and Art 1 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory 
Limitations. 
164 The Apartheid Convention and the International Convention against Apartheid in Sports.  
165 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
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shall be granted for crimes of racial discrimination. While the inclusion of the crime of 
apartheid most likely was seen, at least in part, as a tribute to the victims of the South 
African apartheid regime, it must also have been motivated by the strong belief of the 
delegates at the Rome Conference that such crimes could, and do, occur in other contexts. 
The crime of apartheid is at the interception of human rights law and international 
criminal law. As an aggravated case of racial discrimination, apartheid is a clear breach 
of the principle of racial discrimination of Article 1(3) UN Charter and Article 2 UDHR. 
Apartheid has been an important catalyser in the international community, by unifying 
the UN member states —in the midst of the Cold War era —against the apartheid regime 
of the South African government. The development of the crime of apartheid has 
contributed to the progression of international criminal law and the Rome Statute in 
ways that often are overlooked. The criminalisation of apartheid and its inclusion into 
the Rome Statute, ensuring individual criminal responsibility, is more than a legacy to 
victims of systematic oppression and racial discrimination; the inclusion deserves merit 
as to the farsightedness of the international community when it comes to effectively 
dealing with current and future cases of apartheid. It is now up to the ICC Prosecutor to 
release apartheid’s terminological closeness to the South African context by applying 
Article 7(1)(j) Rome Statute to other situations. The recent reference to the crime 
against humanity of apartheid by Special Rapporteur Richard Falk reveals the continued 
relevance of this crime to current situations. Should the ICC Office of the Prosecutor 
decide to investigate the situation in Palestine, the application of the provision on the 
crime of apartheid is indeed obvious. There is therefore a justified hope that the 
prosecution will use Article 7(1)(j) Rome Statute on the crime of apartheid as a string in 
the prosecutorial bow.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Criminal Court Rome (15 June—17 July 1998). 
